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THE REGULATOR AVOID REGULATORY 
CAPTURE
Marianne Ojo ( marianneojo@hotmail.com) Oxford Brookes University[1]
 ABSTRACT
The incoming Labour administration in 1997 caused a stir when it gave the Bank of England additional  
monetary  policy  powers  but  removed  the  Bank’s  powers  to  regulate  banking.  Up  till  1997,  banking  
regulation had been the function of the Bank of England while other areas of financial services had been  
regulated  by  bodies  such  as:  The  Securities  and  Investment  Board  (for  investment  business)  and  the  
Department of Trade and Industry (for insurance). Section 21 of the Bank of England Act 1998 effectively  
transferred  banking  supervision  to  the  Financial  Services  Authority  (then  known as  the  Securities  and 
Investments  Board).  This  paper  amongst  other  objectives,  aims  to  explore  how the  Financial  Services 
Authority ( the FSA) as a regulator, could benefit from the expertise of the external auditor as a middleman,  
to avoid regulatory capture. As an efficient system of accountability would also help prevent regulatory  
capture, the issue of accountability will also be discussed. A consideration of developments leading to the  
adoption  of  a  single  regulator  in  the  UK,  will  illustrate  how  the  type  of  regulator  can  contribute  to  
knowledge of how the external auditor can assist  the regulator.  Furthermore, not only does this  paper 
consider how the introduction of the FSA has improved transparency and accountability within the banking  
regulatory and supervisory system, but also the claim that the external auditor could further employ his  
expertise to help the regulator avoid regulatory capture. 
 
 
                                             A.    INTRODUCTION
 
Regulatory capture can generally be described as the capture of a regulator by the regulated. One might 
question why a bank regulator requires the help of a financial intermediary such as the external auditor. The 
claim about the external auditor’s role in the regulatory and supervisory process relies on a number of cases, 
auditing standards and comparative analysis with other jurisdictions. The validity of the external auditor’s 
role is also based on global developments, modern technology and change – which have influenced cases 
such as BCCI, Barings and Enron and also influenced auditing standards. The collapses of BCCI, Barings 
and  Enron  reveal  the  critical  role  played  by  external  auditors  and  informational  intermediaries  in  the 
disclosure of vital information. From these cases, a number of problems including the need for continuous 
monitoring by regulatory and supervisory authorities were highlighted. It was also evident that there was a 
limit to what the regulator could do and that expertise was lacking in certain areas – expertise which could 
only be provided by the external auditor. There was growing realisation that more reliance would have to be 
placed on the information and data provided by external auditors. 
 
In considering the role of the external auditor in the banking supervisory and regulatory process, the first part 
of this paper looks at what constitutes regulatory capture and its origins. The paper then considers one of the 
basis  of  the  validity  of  the  claim  namely,  global  developments  which  have  taken  place  prior  to  the 
introduction of the present regulator and why a new regulator was introduced. As mentioned earlier, the type 
of regulator can contribute to knowledge of how the external auditor can assist the regulator. Under the 
review of the literature, which constitutes the second part of this paper, the rationale for regulation will then 
be discussed. Considering the rationale for regulation would also require an extensive examination of the 
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reasons  for  regulation and  the  objectives  of  regulation.  These various  components  cannot  be  treated  in 
isolation when discussing the rationale for regulation. The literature review then considers reasons prompting 
a regulatory response – which should be distinguished from reasons for carrying out financial regulation. The 
paper will then show how a single regulator can fulfil its aims of being sufficiently accountable to industry : 
the purpose of accountability being one of the reasons why the single regulator was introduced. Certain 
jurisdictions will  be considered - with Germany being the focus. The third section of the paper will then go 
on to consider certain accounting standards which govern the auditor’s role and responsibilities in banking 
regulation and supervision. From these standards, the role of the external auditor will be highlighted and it 
will be shown that the external auditor does contribute immensely to the regulatory and supervisory process.
 
An  analysis  of  UK  banking  regulation  (developments,  rationale  for  regulation,  reasons  prompting  a 
regulatory change) and accounting/auditing standards provides a means whereby an assessment can be made 
as to whether the claim that the external auditor can help the regulator avoid regulatory capture is valid. This 
paper also considers what circumstances could render the external auditor prone to the same fate as the 
regulator – that is, circumstances which could render the external auditor incapable of performing his duties. 
In these circumstances, the role of the external auditor could be questioned. A detailed analysis of conflicting 
claims as to whether the external auditor has a role to play in banking regulation and supervision is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Consideration of factors affecting an auditor’s independence and objectivity will 
however be considered – the role of an external auditor requiring an independent and objective mind. Despite 
these  factors,  it  will  be  shown  that  an  external  auditor  has  a  role  to  play  in  banking  regulation  and 
supervision. 
 
 
Regulatory capture
Capture can be referred to as behaviours, active and passive, by responsible authorities, whose behaviours 
act to protect the same illegal, unethical, immoral or anti-public interest practices that those authorities are 
supposed to  be  ‘policing’.[2] The theory of  regulatory capture  was introduced by Richard Posner,  who 
argued that ‘regulation is not about the public interest at all, but is a process, by which interest groups seek to 
promote their  private interest ...  Over time, regulatory agencies come to be dominated by the industries 
regulated.’
 
Briody and  Prenzler  (1998)  attributed  the  occurrence  of  regulatory  capture  to  either  ‘systemic  capture’ 
(procuration  of  an  entire  regulatory  system by  the  regulated  industry)  or  ‘undue  influence’  (personnel 
exchange, identification with values through frequent contact, direct corruption). According to McMahon[3], 
at a first level of capture, the regulator allows the regulated to breach the law, ethic, good practice rule, moral 
principal  or  public  interest  duty  that  the  regulator  is  responsible  for  upholding.  At  a  second level,  the 
regulator assists the regulated to avoid the regulatory consequences after the fact.  At a deepest level of 
development, the ‘capture’ is so complete that the regulator may assist the regulated to defeat the regulatory 
regime before the fact.
Regulation  theories
–      Responsive Regulation : According to L Hill and L Stewart [4], courts need to be aware that their wide 
powers of review can have restrictive effects on the interpretation and enforcement of Parliamentary 
Acts  and  ability  to  support  responsive  strategies.  This  illustrates  the  role  of  courts  in  effective 
implementation and enforcement of national laws including effective implementation of self-regulation. 
The  “Enforced  Self  Regulation  Model”  is  a  form of  responsive  regulation  and  this  model  will  be 
discussed under the heading “The need for sufficient accountability”(page 11 of this paper). The role of 
external auditors in the regulatory  process will very much depend on their ability to regulate themselves 
– which depends on effective law enforcement procedures.
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–      The Public interest theory of regulation : According to this theory, regulation is seen as catering for the 
interests of the public.
–      The  Private  interest  theory  of  regulation  :  Parties  affected  by  regulation  under  this  theory,  try  to 
influence such regulations in such a way that it gives them favorable outcomes. The private  interest 
theory is a form of regulatory capture theory as the private interests of those being regulated overwhelm 
those interests of the public. In the accountancy profession, the Accounting Standards Board not only 
issues standards but is self-regulated. Under the “Enforced Self- Regulation Model” - to be dealt with 
under the literature review, a solution whereby self-regulation could foster accountability and still avoid 
regulatory capture - provided there were public interest groups involved, is illustrated by Grabowsky and 
Braithwaite.
 
Developments in the UK  banking sector
 
The Bank of England Act 1946 had brought about significant changes to the status of the Bank of England 
through bringing the Bank under public control and by transferring capital it held to the Treasury. Following 
a spate of bank failures and institutional collapses: Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB; 1984), Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (BCCI; 1991) and Barings (Britain’s oldest merchant bank; 1995), calls were 
made in favour of regulation (be it banking, investment, or insurance) to be undertaken by a single regulator. 
Other developments which have shaped the banking regulatory regime over the years include changes in 
financial services business: products being harder to categorise as banking, investment or insurance products; 
advances in technology and communications and globalisation. International developments have also played 
an important part  in shaping the banking regulatory regime-especially with the UK’s membership of the 
European  Community  and  the  harmonisation  of  the  regulatory  approach  –  with  the  First  Banking  Co-
ordination Directive being introduced in 1977. 
 
Prior to the Banking Act 1979, there was no statutory requirement that a bank or any similar deposit taking 
institution be authorised to accept deposits or undertake banking business in the UK. The Banking Act 1979 
introduced a two-tier system of authorisation which delineated recognised banks from licensed institutions. 
Recognised banks were given the status based on track-record and standing and were not subject to as much 
statutory requirements as licensed deposit-takers. 
 
The collapse of JMB, a member of the gold-bullion markets in 1984, led to review of the regulatory regime 
for banks. The root cause of the problem had been one of poor systems and controls. JMB was authorised 
under the 1979 Banking Act as a “recognised bank”. Its collapse highlighted the deficiencies of the Banking 
Act 1979, namely that “recognised banks” were not immune from bank failures and also the problems of 
making  a  distinction  between  recognised  banks  and  licensed  deposit  takers.  The  Leigh-Pemberton 
Committee was set up after a meeting between the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, to consider the system for supervising banks.
 
 The result  was the Banking Act 1987 which replaced the two-tier system of regulation and encouraged 
increased co-operation between supervisors and auditors. The Banking Act 1987 chapter 22, Part 1 section 
1(1)  gave  to  the  Bank  of  England  powers  and  the  duty  generally  to  supervise  banks  –  in  particular, 
“institutions authorised to accept deposits”. Under the Banking Act 1979, the term “recognised banks” had 
been used instead of “authorised institutions”. Section 247(3)(c) of the Banking Act 1987 states that the 
words “a recognised bank or licensed Schedule 6 institution within the meaning of the Banking Act 1979”, 
shall be substituted with the words “an authorised institution”. Other sections of the Banking Act 1979 were 
also to substitute the words “a recognised bank”, wherever they occurred, with the words “an authorised 
institution”. According to section 744 of the Banking Act 1987, the definition of “recognised banks” was to 
be omitted and an “authorised institution” to be defined as a company which is an institution under the 
Banking Act 1987. The Bank of England Act 1998 Act unified regulation in the financial services industry-
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with the FSA being an amalgamation of pre-existing regulators and processes.   
 
Prior to the Chancellor’s announcement in 1997, in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a surprising 
revelation  to  transfer  banking  supervision  from  the  Bank  of  England  to  the  Securities  and  
Investments  Board (now  the  FSA), the  system  operating  then  consisted  of  a two-tier system which 
split  responsibility  between  the  SIB (Securities  Investment  Board)and the self-regulating organisations, 
together  with  the  recognised  professional  bodies.  According  to  the  Chancellor’s  announcement,  the 
division  between  the  SIB,  Self-Regulating  Organisations  (SROs)  and  Recognised  Professional  Bodies 
(RPBs),  was  inefficient  and  confusing  for investors and  also lacked  accountability  and  clear  allocation  
of  responsibilities.[5] The source of the problems was related to the Financial Services Act 1986.[6] Under  
the  Act, the  SIB  set  the  overall  framework of  regulation but  did  not itself  act  as  the  direct  regulator 
of most  investment  firms. That function was performed by the second tier regulators - the Self Regulating 
Organisations  (SROs)  being  the  most  prominent  groups.[7] There  were  consistent  concerns  about  the 
effectiveness of the SROs’ efforts to prevent fraud and mis-conduct.[8] The Financial Services and Markets 
Act  2000  (FSMA)  has  replaced  the  Financial  Services  Act  1986,  providing  strong  accountability 
mechanisms in response to the lack of accountability provided by the Financial Services Act 1986.
 
 
    B.   Review of the Literature and analysis of some developments in certain jurisdictions.
 
                             THE RATIONALE  FOR  REGULATION
Why is regulation carried out?
The rationale for financial regulation is an embodiment of two issues namely:1 
– The  problem of systemic risk : There being compelling evidence that a stable financial system provides 
conducive environment for efficient allocation of resources which in turn encourages economic growth2.
– The problem of asymmetric information whereby certain information is known to some people but not to 
others3.  Without  regulation  which  gives  consumers  some independent  assurance  about  the  terms  on 
which their contracts are offered, quality of advice received etc, saving and investment is discouraged 
resulting to damaging economic consequences.4 In addition, healthy competition will be fostered through 
consumer  education and disclosure of  information on charges and other important  characteristics of 
financial products.5
 A distinction has been made by Llewellyn[9] between the objectives of regulation and supervision (the 
outcome regulation is trying to achieve); the rationale  for regulation (why regulation is necessary  if  the  
objectives  are  to  be  achieved) and  the  reasons  for  regulation (why  in  practice  regulation  takes  place). 
As a  result, even though this paper will focus, amongst other issues on the rationale for a single regulator, it 
1 Speech by Howard Davies, former chairman , Financial Services Authority “Building the FSA – Progress to date 
and priorities ahead” Wednesday 30 September 1998. Also see www.fsa.gov.uk
2 ibid
3 ibid
4 ibid
5 ibid
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will investigate the reasons for a change to a single regulator (the FSA) and demonstrate how the objectives 
of the FSA  can  be  achieved  through  a  consideration  of  these  reasons.
 
The  three  core  objectives  of  financial  regulation  and  supervision  as  suggested  by  Llewellyn  are :[10]
 
- To sustain system stability,
- To maintain the safety and soundness of financial institutes, and
- To protect the consumer.
These are similar to the FSA’s objectives as set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 sections 
3-6. The cornerstone of the Act is the statement of regulatory objectives.[11]  The regulatory objectives are: 
maintaining confidence in the financial system, promoting public understanding of the financial  system, 
securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers and reducing financial crime. 
            REASONS PROMPTING A REGULATORY CHANGE 
 
Reasons prompting regulatory change, for  example  the  adoption  of  a  single  regulator  model,  relate  not  
just  to  inefficiency, lack  of  accountability and changing financial markets but also to harmonization and  
convergence  and  bank  collapses.  These  reasons  are  usually  interlinked.  The  origins  of  international 
regulatory  convergence process can  be  traced  back  to  a  sequence of  bank  crises namely, the collapses 
of Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany, Franklin  National Bank in  the  US,  the  secondary banking  crisis in  the 
UK and the  collapse  of  Banco  Ambrosiano  in  Italy  in  the  early  1980s.[12]
 These reasons will now be considered.
 
(i)Developments in financial markets:
As  markets  have  liberalised  and  traditional  banking  business  has  become  less  profitable,  the  line 
between banking  and  other  financial  services  is  becoming less  and  less distinguishable. As noted by 
Vieten[13], there are many reasons as to why a regulatory response is required. The Big  Bang focussed on 
the pace of change in the  financial services industry and the differences between the environment in which 
many regulatory systems came into  being  and  that  in which  they  are  currently  working.[14]
 
As  a  result  of  globalisation,  there  is  now  need  for  all  regulators  to  take  account  of  the whole of  a  
group’s  activities in assessing  the  risk  faced  by  the institutions  they  authorised. This  was emphasised  
in  the Barings  Case where  the collapse of  the  group  was  due to malpractices in  a  single  subsidiary. The 
issue of group structures was also highlighted in the BCCI Case.
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Thirty  years  ago,  financial  markets  were  more  distinguishable:  there  was  clearer  distinction  between 
commercial  banks  and  securities  firms.  There  was  also  a  further  distinction  between institutions  which 
catered  for  wholesale  customers  like  merchant  banks  and  those  which  catered  for  retail  markets  like 
commercial  banks.[15] Supervision focussed then on the activities  of  the  commercial  banks rather than 
securities firms. As deregulation has opened up financial markets to competition from both domestic and 
foreign institutions, such previous distinctions have become blurred. Deregulation has also promoted the 
cross-border flow of capital and attracted investors to seek rewards in overseas markets.[16]  
 
Improvements in information technology have also played a crucial role in  encouraging  both  trading  of  
financial  instruments  across  national  boundaries  and  also  development  of  new  products  including 
derivative instruments.[17] Key  difficulties  however  relate  to  identifying  and  quantifying  the  risks  
associated  with  holding  such  financial  instruments.[18] 
 
(ii) Bank Collapses
The collapse of  JMB, BCCI and Barings triggered a regulatory response. However, it  is also helpful to 
consider the causes of these collapses in evaluating the proper remedies for those collapses. Some causes 
may not necessarily have warranted the creation of a single regulator. A specialist regulator may have failed 
to prevent some failures – not because it is incapable of doing so or not because it is insufficiently equipped 
to do so, but because of the style of supervision adopted by such regulator. In other words, a change in style 
of supervision may be all that was needed to remedy the regulatory problems encountered by the Bank of 
England.  Where lack of sufficient  expertise  about  other sectors  (insurance,  investment or  other sectors) 
contributed to inability to supervise efficiently, then that could warrant the creation of a “mega” regulator 
such as the FSA. In this case, the expertise from different required sectors could be enhanced and combined 
more efficiently.
(iii)International and European Regulatory Convergence Processes
 Vieten notes three main factors driving the harmonization of banking supervision in Britain and Germany 
namely:[19] agreements of the Basle Committee, banking law directives  issued  by  the European Union  
and  perceived  competitive  pressure  to  conform   to  internationally accepted market principles. As also 
stated by Vieten, harmonization initiatives do not necessarily indicate convergence of banking supervision 
as  individual  countries  integrate  the  capital  adequacy ratio  into their  regulatory  systems  in  different  
ways.[20] In certain cases such as new rules being drafted on capital adequacy for banks, there is indeed a 
limit to the usefulness of convergence – as factors affecting such rules may vary from country to country.
In response to the Bankhaus Herstatt collapse, an adhoc committee, the Committee on Banking Regulation 
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and Supervisory Practices came into being.[21] This consisted of governors of the central banks of the Group 
of Ten (“G-10”) countries and Switzerland and was formed at the end of 1974.[22]  The Committee came to 
be known as the “Basle Committee”. The  purpose  of  the  Basle  Committee  is  to  provide  a  means  
whereby  study  of  international  aspects  of  prudential  regulation  and  discussion  of  issues  could  be  
undertaken  between  participating  national  authorities.[23] This  was  aimed  at  elaborating  common  
principles  related  to  strengthening  bank  supervision  and  harmonising  prudential  standards .
 
Three elements are essential  to convergence.[24] These are: a  common definition of capital,  a  common 
framework for measuring capital adequacy and a common minimum standard. Over the years the work of the 
Basle Committee has extended to cover non-credit risks undertaken by banks.[25] This was in response to 
the  development  in  the  global  markets – with  the advent of  the growth of  financial  conglomerates .
 
As  a  result  of  global  changes  and  development  in  global  financial  markets  and  activities  of  banks,  
the  scope  of  bank  supervision  has  also  developed. Two  areas  relevant  to  this  section  are  initiatives  
put  forward  by  the  Basle  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  and  the  European  Union  and  
domestic  developments  in  the  UK.[26] With  respect  to  the  Basle  Committee  and  the  European  
Union,  directives  issued  must  be  taken  into  consideration  but  Basle  guidelines  are  not  legally  
binding  in  the  national  states  concerned. 
 
Such  environmental  and  global  changes  discussed  above  (  which  will  be  classified  as  external  
factors) and  which  may  affect  industry  structure  should  be  distinguished  from  internal  factors (for  
example,  lack  of  proper  implementation  of  internal  controls) which  result  from  within  a  particular  
company - in  considering  an  appropriate  regulatory  response.
 
iv)  The  system  prevailing  prior to the introduction of the FSA was  not  delivering  the  standards  of  
investor  protection  or  supervision  which  both  the  industry  and  public  deserved.  This  reason  would  
also  naturally  incorporate  failures  to  achieve  other  objectives  of  financial  regulation  such  as  
sustaining  system  stability  and  maintaining  the  safety  and  soundness  of  financial  institutes.[27] 
 
v ) The  distinction  between  different  types  of  financial  institutions  and  the  products  which  they  
offered  was  getting  increasingly  blurred :  this  called  for  a  move  from  supervision  which  was  based  
on  institutional  types.
The  increasingly  global  nature  of  the  financial  services  sector  also  called  for  a  change.
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vii) Consolidated  prudential  supervision of  multi-functional  financial  groups  would  provide an  efficient 
way of managing risks related to different  financial  activities.[28] 
 
viii) The  extent  to  which  financial  products  and  contracts  are  significantly  different  from  general  
goods  and  services (these  general  goods  and  services  not  being  regulated  to  the  same  degree  as  
financial  institutions).  
 
ix) The  transfer  of  bank  supervision  to   the  FSA  may  also  avoid  a  situation  where  conflict  of  
interest  occurs.[29] Proponents  of  a  transfer  to  the  FSA  may  argue  in  relation  to  a  conflict  of  
interest, that  a  situation  whereby  the  central  bank  acts  as  lender  of  last  resort and  sets  monetary  
policies  as  well  as  supervisor,  may  give  rise  to  conflict  of  interest.[30]
 
However, Briault ( insert endnote) asserts that arguments against combining responsibilities for  monetary 
policy and banking supervision in a single institution are unsustainable  and  that  the  real  issue  is  whether 
the synergies  in  combining  banking  regulation with monetary policy are greater or less than the alternative 
synergies arising  from  the creation of  a single financial services regulator. He goes on to say that there may 
however be justification in some developing and transition countries, where the central bank stands (almost) 
alone as an institution with independence from political  interference and also has the resources to recruit and 
retain  high  calibre  staff.  He  adds  that  in  those  circumstances,  the  effectiveness  of  financial  services 
regulation could be compromised if this function were removed from the central bank.   
Briault does not argue for or against whether one institution should perform both functions of monetary 
policy and bank supervision. He is stating that real issue does not relate to whether one institution performs 
one or both functions but about weighing benefits of a single regulator against benefits of both functions 
being entrusted to one authority.
I partly agree with Briault. Weighing the benefits of having a single regulator against benefits of functions of 
supervision and monetary policy setting being entrusted to one authority would seem to imply that the less 
favorable option should be discarded. However both options can still  be combined as central banks and 
single regulators have their unique beneficial attributes.  If there are more benefits than disadvantages in 
having a single institution (the central bank), perform both functions (considering the jurisdiction's political 
and  other  internal  structures),   then  the  single  regulator  should still  carry out  supervisory functions  – 
however  this  should  be  done  in  close  collaboration  with  the  central  bank.  Benefits  in  having  a  single 
regulator amongst other things, includes better management of risks generated by various types of businesses 
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and their associations. This is an attribute which cannot be provided by the central bank – whether or not it 
performs just the sole function of monetary policy setting or additional supervisory responsibilities. Likewise 
the  knowledge  and  expertise  of  the  central  bank  is  something  which  cannot  be  generated  by  a  single 
regulator. The main issue should be whether a particular jurisdiction benefits more or less from having a 
single regulator in comparison to having a functional regulator. In my opinion, the function of monetary 
policy setting is one which should be carried out by the central bank alone. In addition, the question of 
achieveing the right  design of regulatory structure of  a particular jurisdiction will  need to be examined 
against the background of a particular financial structure of each country rather than being generalised.6
There are many reasons in favour of the central bank also acting as supervisor7 and these are as follows : 
That the central bank must have concern for the efficient working of the payments system and that as a 
result, it should also supervise and regulate at least the main money-market commercial banks at the heart of 
the system; that any rescue or liquidity crises will usually require quick injection of cash-which can only be 
done by the central bank. For this reason, it  is argued that the central bank and supervisory body work 
closely together and that this can best be achieved through internalising the supervisory body within the 
central bank; and that separation would involve wasteful duplication as there is bound to be a lot of overlap 
between areas of interest of and information required by and accessible to both the supervisor and the central 
bank.
Arguments for separation include : Where government financing is required for any large rescue, politicians 
and the Ministry of Finance are likely to be involved. For this reason, it is important for the central bank to 
become more independent in the conduct of monetary policy and less politically involved in its supervisory 
role; that bank failures affect credibility and the central bank requires credibility in conducting its monetary 
policies;  and where concerns for the micro-level health and stability of parts of the banking system might 
affect the aim of the central bank's conduct of monetary macro-policy – that is, where there is conflict of 
interest between the combination of monetary and regulatory function.
x)  Unified financial services regulation may also reduce duplication and over-regulation.
 
By fulfilling its purpose and providing justification for these reasons, the FSA will be able to achieve its 
regulatory  objectives  namely,  maintaining  confidence  in  the  financial  system,  promoting  public 
understanding of the  financial  system,  securing the  appropriate  degree  of  protection for  consumers  and 
reducing financial crime. According to the FSA Annual Report 2004/05, sector teams within the FSA have 
been pursuing the objectives of the FSA. In relation to consumers, the launch of “FSA Connection” detailing 
6 Also see C Goodhart and D Schoenmaker ' Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies' 
(Financial Markets Group Special Papers 1992 ) 161
7 C Goodhart and D.Schoenmaker  ' Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies ' (Financial 
Markets Group Special Papers 1992 )140-141; CAE Goodhart The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation 
(1998) 249
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regulatory issues affecting consumers, reaching over 3000 advisers and advice agencies has taken place. In  
view  of  the  difficulty  of  quantifying  benefits  and  costs  of  regulation,  the  FSA  has  been  working  
with  the  Henley  Centre  to  establish  outcomes  which  are  capable  of  being  measured  in  an  open  and  
transparent  way – in  order  to  demonstrate  the  impact  of  regulation  on  markets  and  consumers. The 
Financial Services Practitioner and the Consumer Panels also play important roles in the accountability and 
regulatory framework established under the FSMA 2000.
 
In relation to financial crime, publication of a report on “Countering Financial Crime Risks in Information 
Security” was also carried out. The fight against financial  crime  continues to focus on  the FSA’s  aims : 
namely the monitoring of  standards of  systems and controls  in the firms regulated by the  FSA,  increasing  
the  FSA’s  understanding  of  fraud  risks  across  the  financial  sector  and  working  closely  with  other 
authorities,  in  particular  the  Home  Office  and  law  enforcement.  In  relation  to  financial  stability,  
research  into  the  use  of  stress  by  major  firms  (as  part  of  their  risk  management  framework)  has  
been  undertaken  and  results  are  due  shortly. In addition, the  FSA  has  taken  steps  to  be  more  open  
about  risk  considerations  across  different  number  of  firms  and  has  been  putting  information  on  their  
website  about  their  response  to  these  kinds  of  risks.
 
Llewellyn has also given reasons in support of a unified regulator.[31] These include the introduction of 
economies of scale – especially with regards to skills provided by employees, the avoidance of problems of 
inconsistencies, duplication, overlap and gaps which could arise where a system of several agencies existed, 
the  rational  utilization  of  scarce  human  resources  and  expertise.  Other  reasons  which  have  influenced 
countries to set up unified regulators, as stated by Llewellyn include[32] the growth of financial innovation, 
the  complexity  and  extensiveness  of  objectives  behind  regulation  in  some countries  and  the  increasing 
internationalisation of financial operations. However he also highlights possible shortcomings[33] such as 
the erosion of functional distinctions between financial institutions, lack of clear focus on the objectives and 
rationale of regulation (not  making necessary differentiations between different types of institutions and 
businesses such as wholesale an retail business), possibilities of cultural conflict since regulators come from 
different sector backgrounds, possibilities of creating an excessively bureaucratic single regulator with too 
much power. There is also the fear that consumers will no longer take responsibilities for their actions – 
thereby generating the moral hazard problem (people believe that the government is keeping an eye on the 
behaviour of the regulated business and so not monitoring as they should). 
 
Consumers are not adequately equipped with sufficient means to judge the safety and soundness of the 
financial system. This is the main reason why prudential regulation is necessary – because of imperfect 
consumer information, agency problems associated with the nature of financial institutions’ business and 
because the actions of a financial firm after consumers have dealt with it affects the value of their interests in 
that firm.[34] However, as stated above, the FSA has provided mechanisms to deal with this - including the 
Financial Services Practitioner and the Consumer Panels which play important roles in the accountability and 
regulatory framework established under the FSMA 2000. The Financial Services Consumer Panel advises 
the  FSA on all  aspects  of  its  work – at  the  same time monitoring its  effectiveness  from a consumer’s 
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perspective.[35]
 
The Financial Services Practitioner Panel (‘the Panel’) was set up by the FSA in 1998. Subsequently the 
FSMA 2000 established the Panel as a statutory body alongside the Consumer Panel.[36] The Consumer 
Panel represents the interests of consumers to the FSA. This was in recognition of the important role of both 
Panels  in  the  accountability  and regulatory framework established under  the  Act.  Both Practitioner  and 
Consumer Panels became statutory on 18 June 2001.
 
Summary
Reasons for adopting a single regulator have been considered. As well as  reflecting the financial services 
markets  and  reducing  duplications  and  inconsistencies,  a  single  regulator  presents  opportunities  for  
developing  a  rational  and  coherent  regulatory  system.[37] A  single  complaints  handling  and  
Ombudsman  system  has  been  set  up as well as a Financial Services Compensation Scheme.[38]  This 
would help avoid inconsistencies and fill regulatory gaps which as a result, would give rise to benefits of 
economies of scale.[39] As regulated firms would be dealing with one regulator, regulatory costs associated 
with authorisation procedures, monitoring and disciplinary procedures would also be reduced.[40] Concerns 
associated with a single regulator are inherent in its enormous size and monopoly position.[41] Lack of 
regulatory competition may also hinder innovation in regulatory techniques.[42] Bank collapses triggered the 
creation of a single regulator. However, has the regulatory response to regulatory problems and occurring 
events been appropriate?
What  kind  of  response  could  be  anticipated  and  how  could  that  kind  of  response  be  achieved? In  
order  to  answer  the  first  of  these  questions,  one  needs  to  analyse  the  regulatory  problems  and  
events  concerned  and  the  lessons  to  be  learned  from  the  bank  collapses.  In  response  to  the  latter  
question,  a  consideration  of  how  a  good  regulatory  policy  can  be  achieved  is  required.
 
In assessing the role of the external auditor in banking regulation and supervision, it is not only important to 
look at the type of regulator. The system of supervision is also important. According to the Core Principles 
( Basel Core Principles) for effective Banking Supervision 1997, an effective banking supervisory system 
should consist of some kind of both “on-site” and “off-site” supervision. Off-site supervision involves the 
regulator making use of external auditors. On-site work is usually done by the examination staff of the bank 
supervisory agency or commissioned by supervisors but may be undertaken by external auditors. The system 
of supervision under the Bank of England was discretionary based. It was based on an informal system of 
supervision and on trust. Following the collapse of BCCI, Lord Justice Bingham made recommendations that 
included the need to adopt a more rule-based or inspection based approach to supervision. Although the 
Bingham  report  did  not  suggest  a  move  towards  the  US  supervisory  system  which  relies  on  on-site 
examinations  by independent  inspectors,  rather  than on bank auditors,  it  was asserted that  the  Bank of 
England had relied excessively on BCCI’s auditors. 
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            THE NEED FOR SUFFICIENT ACCOUNTABILITY
Prior to the introduction of the FSA , the Financial Services Authority, it was believed that the system that 
existed  in the UK lacked transparency and sufficient accountability partly as a result  of  its  fragmented 
regulatory structure.[43] Even though the FSA is independent of Government, it is still accountable not only 
to Government but also to Parliament, the industry and consumers. The Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 establishes eight  main accountability mechanisms for the FSA.[44]  However, many questions and 
concerns have been raised about accountability in relation to single regulators because of the concentration  
of  powers  inherent  in  the  all  encompassing  nature of  their  role:[45] Can a single regulator be made 
sufficiently accountable to industry whilst  avoiding  regulatory  capture?
 
The Enforced Self-Regulation Model could help a single regulator to achieve this. As mentioned previously, 
regulatory capture can generally be  described as  the  capture of  a regulator  by the  regulated.  Under the 
Enforced  Self-Regulation  Model,  companies  and  firms  (the  regulated)  are  given  the  responsibility  of 
regulating themselves  whilst  the  regulator  oversees  these  firms.  Grabosky and Braithwaite[46] illustrate 
situations whereby capture is more likely to occur. Characteristics include where: only one industry is being 
regulated, where the regulator is part of a larger organisation, where there is  conflict  between  regulator 
and  the  regulated, where regular contact occurs between the regulator and  the regulated and/or where a 
regular  exchange  of  personnel  occurs  between  the  regulator  and  the  regulated.  In  the  first  of  these 
characteristics,  capture is  unlikely to occur with the FSA as it  regulates more than one industry.  These 
industries include the banking, insurance, investment industries, building societies, credit unions, pension 
funds,  markets  and  exchanges.  Whether  the  FSA is  part  of  a  larger  organisation  is  debatable.  Whilst 
functioning  under  a  truly  integrated  approach,  for  example  when  adopting  its  new  single  risk-based 
integrated approach across all regulated sectors, the FSA could be referred to as a regulator acting on its own 
and not as part of a larger organisation. However, where it acts under the capacity of a lead regulator – as it 
does under the lead regulator model, this would present a situation whereby it could be classed as part of a 
larger organisation. Other characteristics given whereby capture is more likely to occur can be avoided much 
more  easily  by  the  FSA through  clear  delegation  and  delineation  of  responsibilities.  A  variant  of  the 
characteristics given by Grabosky and Braithwaite could also exist in an individual situation. For example, 
where more than one industry is being regulated, there could also be conflict between the regulator and the 
regulated – in which case, capture is also likely to occur.
 
It  is  argued that  direct  government regulation provides  disincentives  for  nominated accountability[47] - 
because  nominated  accountability  ‘puts  heads  on  the  prosecutor’s  chopping  block’.  However,  direct 
government regulation also promotes accountability as it is easier to identify who is responsible for any fault 
committed, hence no “passing of the buck”. Apart from the Enforced Self-Regulation Model, the regulator 
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could also employ the services of a “middle-man” to help carry out the regulation of firms. This would help 
prevent the regulator from getting too involved and influenced by the activities of the firms being regulated 
whilst ensuring that the middleman provides some oversight. It is still vital for the regulator to be involved in 
the oversight process, albeit to a lesser degree than would be if the middleman were not involved. This 
research amongst other objectives,  aims to explore how the FSA as a regulator,  could benefit  from the 
expertise of the external auditor as a middleman, to avoid regulatory capture.
 
 The less the number of middlemen involved, the more accountability that can be ensured. However even 
with  the  involvement  of  more  middlemen,  accountability  can  still  be  ensured  as  long  as  there  is  clear 
delegation of responsibilities but it is more expensive and time consuming. One significant advantage of 
involving more middlemen is that there is more segregation of duties – hence less likelihood of one sole 
department  abusing  a  system  without  being  detected.  Even  though  some  would  argue  that  the  more 
middlemen you have, the more likelihood there is of conflict of interests, this is not always necessarily so. If 
the law and goals involved are clearly defined and each department knows what they are aiming for and 
there  is  clear  coordination and  adequate  supervision,  adequate  oversight  by the  regulator,  any  potential 
conflict of interest should and could be significantly minimised. In addition, focus on punitive measures need 
not always be on the regulated alone. The regulator and middlemen involved should account for inadequate 
supervision  or  lack  of  supervision.  Enforced  self-regulation  provides  incentives  for  nominated 
accountability because corporations that cannot demonstrate that they are conducting their own executions 
would  be  singled  out  for  inquisition.[48] Enforced  self-regulation  represents  an  extension  and 
individualization of co-regulation.[49] Co-regulation is distinguished from enforced self-regulation to mean 
industry-association  self-regulation  with  some  oversight  and/or  ratification  by  government.[50] Co-
regulation could also be carried out  by the external  auditor  in collaboration with certain public  interest 
groups.
 
Using the Enforced Self-Regulation Model,  the greater  the level/amount of  regulation  carried  out  by  
government/state, the lesser the punishment  that  would  be  imposed  on  any  company/firm in  the event 
that  non-compliance  were discovered. Another  model  of  Enforced  Self-Regulation which could  have 
been successful  but  which  has  to  be  discounted  is  that whereby  the  punitive measures  imposed  are  
directly  proportional  to  the  level  of  non-compliance. As a result, the greater the level of non -compliance, 
the greater the sanctions imposed. The failure of  this  model  lies  in  the  fact  that  there’s potential  for  
moral  hazard as  fraud or  non-compliance  perpetrators are encouraged to take more risk and commit more 
crimes (exploiting  the system more often) as the punitive measures are bearable – provided  they  committed 
it “discretely”. The punitive measures could even be avoided or escapable – as a result, more offenders 
would be encouraged to take the risk as they would not have much to lose – even if  they were caught.
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However, a combination of  these so-called “minor offences”  have  the  potential  to  create  even  more 
serious consequences than  the “major offences”. To illustrate this, an offender could commit a series of 
fraud involving insignificant sums of money in separate individual circumstances. When these sums add up, 
their effect could be greater than what would occur if a single significant sum of money were involved.
 
Styles of/ forms of integrated regulation and supervision in other jurisdictions
The  growth  of  financial  conglomerates  has  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  single  regulator  model  in  many 
financial markets. Bringing together the regulation of different types of financial businesses was pioneered 
by Scandinavia and  is occurring  in many parts of  the world, especially in the  Far East. The big  exception  
is  the US whilst  in Australia, there  is division  between  prudential  and  conduct  of  business  regulation – 
as  well  as  the  division  between different  sectors.[51] Although unified financial services supervision has 
been adopted differently in many countries, its application has varied from country to country and there is no 
single proper way of introducing or implementing unified financial services supervision.[52]
 
Financial Regulation and Supervision in Germany
As well as the UK, Germany  has  also considered integrated financial  supervision  as  the  best  response  
to  the  growth  of  financial  conglomerates. In her paper, Tatyana Filipova[53] concludes that the German 
Gesetz  ueber  die  integrierte  Finanzaufsicht  (the  Law on Integrated Financial  Services  Supervision  in 
Germany) has not  managed so far  to realise the alleged benefits  of integrated financial  supervision.  In 
contrast  to  the  UK where  major  legislative  changes  occurred,  the  substantive  law was  not  amended in 
Germany to utilise the integrated supervisory structure.[54]
 
The  Banking  Act  Gesetz  ueber das Kreditwesen (Kreditwesengesetz – KWG), is  the  legal  basis  for  
banking  supervision  in  Germany  and  it  aims  at  safeguarding  the  viability  of  the  banking  industry – 
which  is  particularly  sensitive  to  fluctuations, by  protecting  creditors .  
 
The German Banking Act consists of six parts, each part subdivided into divisions.  There are  sixty – four 
sections covering the six parts of  the Act (Kreditwesengesetz , KWG  last  amended  through Article 5 of  
the  law of  5th April 2004, BGBI.IS.502). 
 
Central  to  the  Gesetz  ueber  die  integrierte  Finanzaufsicht is  the  Gesetz  ueber  die  Bundesanstalt  
fuerFinanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (FINDAG) – Law on the Federal  Financial  Supervisory Authority.[55] 
FINDAG established a single authority – the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt fuer 
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Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin) which acts as supervisor over all financial services providers.[56]
 
Banking supervision is carried out by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, the  Bundesanstalt fuer 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin (previously banking supervision had been carried out by the Federal 
Banking  Supervisory  Office).  BaFin  was  set  up  pursuant  to  the  law  on  Integrated  Financial  Services 
Supervision in Germany.[57] This law was  adopted  by  Parliament  on  the  22nd  April  2002  and  on  the  
1st  May  2002,  BaFin was formally established.[58] BaFin is  a  federal  institution and also part of  the 
institutions which operate under the Federal Ministry of Finance.
 
Section 6 of the Banking Act  assigns the central role  in  banking  supervision  to  the  Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority (BaFin) whilst section 7 states the  collaboration between BaFin
and the Deutsche Bundesbank (the German Central  Bank)  in  the  supervision of  banks.
 
The legislature provided for the Bundesbank to be  involved  in  banking  supervision  having  recognised 
that  functions  of  the  authority  responsible  for  banking  supervision  and  those  of  the  central  bank  are 
interconnected.[59] Participation  of  the  Bundesbank  was  considered  necessary  since  the  then  Federal 
Banking Supervisory Office had no substructure of its own.[60]  It  was only the  Bundesbank system, with 
its main  offices  and  branch  offices that  permitted efficient  and  cost-effective supervision, at local level, 
of the over 4000 credit institutions  in  the  Federal  Republic of  Germany.[61]
 
There is clear division of functions between the Federal Financial Supervisory Office and the Bundesbank in 
the area of banking supervision[62]. When asked what made the German  approach so  special,  Jochen  
Sanro,  President  of  the  Federal Banking Supervisory Office of Germany responded  by  saying: - The 
answer, of  course, is  the significant  role the Bundesbank  will  play  in  banking  supervision, and that  is  
the reason, why I  would  like  to  call  the  new  BaFin a ‘modified’ single regulator as compared to the 
British FSA, for  example…-[63]  
 
 The  BaFin  has  3  main  objectives :[64]
- To  ensure  the  functioning  of  the  entire  financial  industry  in  Germany.  From this objective, 2 others 
can be inferred:
- To  safeguard  the  solvency  of  banks,  financial  services  institutions  and  insurance  undertakings
- To protect clients and investors.
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BaFin maintains that as a unified regulatory agency, it would be able to develop more effective rules in 
managing risk – as compared to all previous financial regulators.[65]
The  development  of  banking  supervision  after  the  Second  World  War, Basic  features  of  the  Banking  
Act  will  be  considered  in  later paper.        
 
According  to  its  draft  legislation  to  create  an  integrated  financial  services  regulator,  Germany  
considered  integrated  financial  services  supervision  as  the  best  was  of  dealing  with  dynamic  
changes  in  the  financial  markets. The  Gesetz  ueber  die intergrierte  Finanzaufsicht  does  not  define  a  
set  of  objectives  that  the  Federal  Financial  Supervisory  Authority  should  pursue  during  the 
performance of  its  functions[66] - the respective laws for banking, insurance  and  securities supervision 
being defined by different objectives for the different  financial  sectors.[67] The Gesetz ueber die integrierte  
Finanzaufsicht also  does  not  assign  new responsibilities  in  contrast  to  the  FSA which  new additional 
supervisory responsibilities. It merely  transfers  the  responsibilities  of  the  previous  specialist  supervisors 
–  the  Federal  Banking  Supervisory  Authority,  the  Federal  Insurance  Supervisory  Authority  and  the  
Supervisory  Office  for  Securities.
 
In  contrast  to  the  FSA,  the  BaFin  doesn’t  have  rule-making  powers  to  converge  the  sectoral  
supervisory  practices.[68]  Different  approaches  to  regulation  and  supervision  with  respect  to  banks,  
securities  and  insurance  companies  exist  in  Germany  and  the  poor  definition  of  the  objectives  
relating  to  these  industries  may  provide  little  guidance  to  the  BaFin  when  the  different  supervisory  
objectives  come  into  conflict as the  current  legislation  does  not  provide  a  way  of  deciding  on  the  
supremacy  of  the  different  supervisory  objectives.[69]
 
In  contrast  to  the  UK where  the  Bank  of  England  is  not  involved  in  supervision  of  financial 
institutions, the German Central Bank , the Deutsche Bundesbank  assists  BaFin in exercising supervision 
over  credit  and  financial  institutions.  The  Bundesbank  is  in  charge  of  ongoing  monitoring  which  
includes  evaluation of  documents submitted  by  institutions,  auditors reports pursuant  to KWG section  26 
(Gesetz  ueber  das  Kreditwesen, Banking Act) and the annual financial  statements.[70] The Bundesbank 
performs  ,  evaluates  audits  of  banking  operations  with  the  aim  of  assessing  the  adequacy  of 
institutions’capital and risk management  procedures  as  well  as  appraising  audit  findings  and it may also 
be entrusted by BaFin with  the task  of  performing audits at the credit and financial  institutions.[71]
 
The Central Bank’s Role in maintaining stability.
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As well as being involved in the supervisory process, the Bundesbank is also involved in matters relating to 
supervisory policy-making. As a member of the Financial Markets Regulatory Forum, it is acknowledged as 
an authority that together with BaFin  is  responsible  for  the  stability of  the financial  system.[72] 
 
From the points mentioned so far, it could be argued that the reorganisation of the legal framework carried 
out  in the UK is a better way of implementing integrated financial  supervision. On the other hand, the 
involvement of  the central  bank  in  supervision,  as  is the case in Germany, could also be a  better way of  
implementing  integrated  financial  supervision. However, even though the Bank of England is not  involved 
in supervision (as is the case in Germany), the FSA continues to work  closely  in exchanging information  
with the Bank of England and the Treasury  under  the 1997 Memorandum of Understanding. In addition, the 
close cooperation  between  the FSA and the Bank of England is  strengthened by  the cross-membership of  
the chairman of  the  FSA as a  member of  the Court of  the Bank of England and  by  the  deputy  Governor 
of  the Bank of  England  being a member  of  the  FSA  Board.[73]
 
Briault[74] also  concludes  that  experience in  the  UK  since the creation of  the  FSA  has demonstrated  
that  information can  and  does  flow effectively in both  directions between a central bank and a separate 
integrated financial  services  regulator and that the Bank of England and  the  FSA  share and discuss at  all  
levels  a  large volume of  information.
 A  more critical  analysis  of  the  legal  framework of  the  British and German systems,  the  relationship  
between the central  banks and  supervisory authorities and other related factors  will  be  required  before  
an  assessment can  be  concluded.
 
Financial Regulation and Supervision in Italy
One of the foremost debates focussed around Italian regulation at present is related to the issue of the best 
regulatory structure. Banking regulation and supervision in Italy has always been the function of the central 
bank. Even though the 1936 Banking Law actually created a separate banking inspectorate, this was headed 
by the Governor of the Bank of Italy and staffed by the personnel of the Bank.[75] The supervisory function 
was transferred back to the Bank in 1947.The Italian Securities and Exchange Commission,  Commissione 
Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa (CONSOB) was established in 1974. It shares regulatory responsibilities 
with the Bank of Italy. Whilst the Bank focuses on financial stability, the prudential supervision of banks, 
financial companies and investment firms, CONSOB is in charge of transparency and investor protection. As 
a result, it not only has regulatory powers over companies as issuers of securities but also over banks and 
investment firms as providers of investment services to the public.[76] Separate supervisors regulate and 
supervise the insurance and pensions industries.
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Changes in the Italian banking industry and legal framework
Between 1990 and 1992, several Parliamentary Acts consolidated the Amato Law, resulting in a complete 
change of the legal framework  for banking. The Amato Law (218/1990) formed the basis of the legal 
framework and paved way for the privatisation of the Italian public banking system. In 1993, the Legislative 
Decree 385 of 1st Sept 1993 (the 1993 Banking Law), replaced the 1936 Banking Law and consolidated all 
previous legislation in the banking industry. Under the 1993 Banking Law, previous distinctions between 
deposit  banks  and  long-term  specialised  credit  institutions  were  abolished  and  a  model  asymmetric  to 
universal banking established. This was the start of a new era of consolidated supervision in which banking 
groups were formally recognised and non-bank financial intermediaries were incorporated in the regulatory 
framework.
The North South Divide
Per capita GDP in Southern Italy is about 30% lower than national average with unemployment rate being 
around 18% - compared with 6% in the central parts and 3.8% in the north. During the recession of 1992-93, 
the  reduction  of  domestic  demand and interest  rate  adjustments  required  to  face  the  crisis  affected  the 
profitability of firms. As a result of difficulties experienced by the southern banking system, supervisory 
action was required from the Bank of Italy and this was aimed at fundamental aims of protecting depositors 
and maintaining financial support for businesses in the south.[77]  Between 1990 and 1995, on site controls 
were undertaken in the southern banking system and around 60% negative evaluation received – in contrast 
to 15% received by banks in the central and northern parts of Italy. The process of rehabilitating southern 
banks was aided through the  Interbank Deposit Protection Fund and contribution from banking groups. 
One of such banking groups included Banco di Napoli. As the leading bank in South Italy, it had acted to 
support the southern banks and had been slow in adapting back – particularly in the face of an increasing 
competitive market. 
The  need  to  prevent  a  serious  impact  on  the  South’s  economy,  avoid  systemic  risks  required  special 
legislation to be approved for the rescue of Banco di Napoli. As a result, Law 588 of 19 November 1996 was 
enacted and it provided for the Treasury to supply funds for recapitalisation. This was a unique occurrence as 
it was the first time public intervention had been made to adopt a restructuring plan which was approved by 
the Bank of Italy. Banco di Napoli’s structures were renewed and factors which resulted in its crisis (factors 
such as bank loan portfolio, high costs and low efficiency of its operations) were corrected to align it with 
national average requirements.  
Financial Regulation and Supervision in the US
Even  though  there  is  now an  increasing  trend  towards  the  adoption  of  a  single  consolidated  financial 
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regulator, the US system of financial regulation is based on a functional regulatory framework. In his speech, 
Ethiopis  Tafara[78] stated  that  whilst  there  were  advantages  with  consolidated  financial  regulation,  the 
advantages inherent in functional regulation (the system adopted by the US) should not be ignored. He also 
mentioned that consolidated regulation was based on unproven assumptions.
 
Advantages of functional regulation
Tafara states that insurance, banking and securities regulators all have an interest in prudential regulation – 
maintaining the health and soundness of financial firms and that all functional regulators have an interest in 
enforcing the law. He goes on to add that the differences between the functional regulators include the fact 
that  ‘consumer  protection’  and  systemic  stability  for  insurance  and  banking  regulators  mean  that 
enforcement activities were carried out more ‘discreetly’ and this was as a result of banking and insurance 
regulators’ concerns that public enforcement activities would lead depositors or consumers to lose faith in 
the firm involved – thereby leading to a run on the bank. In contrast securities regulators tend to have 
aggressive  approach  in  public  enforcement  procedures  and  believe  that  public  enforcement  actions  are 
necessary to deter fraud and reassure investors about the integrity of the system. He also mentions that in the 
US, since bank deposits were frequently insured by the government, bank regulators were very concerned 
about moral hazard problems – that banks would make reckless decisions in hopes of getting higher returns, 
knowing that depositor losses would be borne by the government. With investors in securities markets, there 
is no such investor insurance scheme and securities regulators emphasize disclosure rather than prudential 
regulation.  Despite  this  statement,  there  is  still  confusion  between  the  Securities  Investor  Protection 
Corporation (SIPC) and the FDIC. Insurance for investment fraud does not exist in the US – the SIPC is not 
the  securities  market  equivalent  of  FDIC (Federal  Deposit  Insurance Corporation).  Congress  considered 
creating  a  Federal  Broker  Dealer  Insurance  Corporation  but  lawmakers  widely  concluded  it  would  be 
inappropriate  in  the  risk-based  investment  market  place  which  is  different  from  that  of  the  banking 
world.[79] This approach by the US is to be contrasted with the Investor Compensation Directive which was 
modelled on the Deposit-Guarantee Schemes Directive (94/19/EC) which provided for the universal nature 
of  banks  and  growth  of  financial  conglomerates.  The  need  for  consistency  between  the  Investor 
Compensation Directive and the Deposit  Guarantee Schemes Directive – in the case of  banks acting as 
investment firms, is highlighted.
As a result of the differences in priorities between bank, insurance and securities regulators, an advantage of 
functional regulation could be said to be that it takes into account the differences and needs of the various 
markets  involved.  In  addition,  even  though banks  place  more  emphasis  on  prudential  supervision  than 
securities markets,  both  banking and securities regulators still  have an interest  in prudential  regulation. 
Sa`me thing applies to the issue of public enforcement activities. A system of functional regulators would 
definitely achieve a better policy objectives ‘mix’ than a situation where a consolidated regulator operated 
with one ‘consolidated’ objective for different financial sectors. The FSA has been able to avoid such a 
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problem by operating according to a functional approach. 
 
 Areas  for  particular  consideration  
As part of  its future work, the Consumer Panel  seeks  to[80] :  Put  the  “service”  back  into financial 
services, encourage the FSA to improve its communication with  consumers, assess (using a holistic rather 
than piecemeal approach) the FSA’s  effectiveness, weighing  its  impact  from  the  consumer perspective, 
treat consumers  fairly : this priority has always  been supported – however, more focus will  be  placed on 
its implementation and evaluation, seeking to encourage European bodies and Commission to improve their 
dialogue with consumer representatives across the  European Union.
Managing and controlling the risks inherent in a bank’s operating activities 
The  role  of  the  bank  supervisor:  How  can  risks  be  managed  in  a  volatile  environment?  Instruments 
contributing to volatility within the  financial  environment  should  be  regulated – especially  when  they 
constitute  an  amount  in the  region  of  billions  of  currency value. A  study  of the  market  impact  of  
hedge  funds  and  consideration  of  the  FSA’s  regulatory  approach has been  undertaken  and  a  paper  
will  be  published  shortly.[81] 
 
 The FSA presently operates according to risk based regulation and resource allocation.[82] Alan Greenspan 
has  recently stated[83]  that  hedge funds should  not  pose  a  threat  to  financial  stability  so  long as  
lending  banks  managed  their  risk  sensibly.  It is difficult  to  see  how  banks can manage their risk when 
the root  cause  is  not  being dealt  with – especially where the situation involves a  rise in  assets  such   as  
huge amounts unregulated hedge funds. If instruments such as  hedge  funds  could  lead  to volatility,  then  
they  should  fall under instruments to  be  regulated  by  the  FSA.
 
As highlighted in the Barings Case, banks mainly fail due to management incompetence – which is in some 
cases, accelerated by poor controls. As such  there are strong arguments for focus on bank  supervision to be 
more on monitoring  controls and procedures implemented by management and less focus on the  traditional  
area  of  ensuring that adequate capital is  being maintained – though both  are  important.[84]
 
International co-ordination of bank supervision
The  BoBS  report  into the collapse of Barings Bank highlighted the need  for  closer  cooperation  between 
the  Bank  of  England  and  other  regulators  both  in  the  UK  and  overseas.  The  report  welcomed  the 
development  of  a  formal  Memoranda  of  Understanding  between  regulators  internationally  and  further 
recommended the use of joint teams of supervisors to visit banks. The Memorandum of Understanding has 
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helped to ensure timely and efficient coordination and allocation of work between  the FSA, the  Bank of  
England and the Court  of  the Bank of England  with experience to date on information  sharing  showing  
that  the arrangements will work  effectively  in  the  course  of  a  crisis.[85] In addition to this, the FSA as a 
single  financial services regulator  should  be  able  to  provide  better and quicker access  to information  
about  the  overall  position  of  a  financial  conglomerate  in  a situation of  difficulty  than might  have  
been  available  in  the  past  from  multiple  regulators  responsible  for  individual  firms  within  the  
conglomerate.[86]
 
FSA’s work so far
The period from the 1st  April  2004  to  the  31st  March  2005  saw  particularly  the  review of 2 aspects of  
the  FSA’s  performance.  The first of  these  aspects  was  the  examination of  the costs  imposed  on  the  
regulated – this being done jointly with  the Practitioner Panel.[87] The second was the examination of the 
effectiveness and fairness of the FSA’s enforcement process. 
 
The FSA has so far managed to keep its costs under control.[88] According  to  an  FSA comparative report  
of direct costs of  regulation, the UK ranked second cheapest  behind  Sweden (another  single  regulator  
country)  with US  regulatory costs  being  18  times  those  of  the  UK[89]   However, there are concerns  
that  the FSA has only  achieved  this  because  of  regulated  firms which have faced a sharp increase  in  
compliance costs – with a larger  proportion  of  these compliance costs being  passed  disproportionately  to  
smaller  firms.[90] 
Hampton’s recommendations relating  to the advantages  of  integrated  regulatory  organisations and  risk-
based  regulation  have  been  embedded  in  the  way  the  FSA operates.[91]  Efforts  have  also  been 
devoted  to  finding  ways  to  restrict  regulatory  intervention  to  areas  where  no market  solution  is  
possible  and where  regulation  has  the  potential to do good rather  than harm.[92]  In relation to consumer 
credit however, the Chairman had reservations about the wholesale transfer of such related responsibilities to 
the FSA.[93]
 
Concerns also  remain  over  hedge  funds – in  which  case  the  jurisdiction  of  the  FSA  is limited. The 
FSA  does  not  authorise  the  funds  and  most  of  the  administrators   of  these  hedge  funds  are  located 
offshore.[94]
 
At  present, the main concern  relating  to the  FSA  relates to whether the FSA’s  human  resources  can  
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attract  and  retain  a  sufficient  number  of  well  qualified  staff  because  of  the  gap  in  pay  levels  
between  private  and  public sectors.[95]
 
As of now, the FSA regime doesn’t exhibit signs of having been captured by industry.[96] There have 
been  criticisms  from  industry that  the FSA is too  consumer-orientated and criticisms  from consumer 
groups  that  the  FSA is  too pro-industry but it is naturally too early to draw conclusions as to whether the 
FSA has been successful or not. As  regards  economies of  scale, it  is  difficult  to  say  whether  the  FSA  
has  been  able  to  benefit  since  it  took  over supervision from  the  Bank  of  England. This  is  because of  
the difficulty  in providing  a  precise  comparison  of  costs, the  impact  of  transitional costs  in  moving  to 
a  single  regulator and  the  increased  costs  of  the  FSA  as  a  result  of  its additional  responsibilities 
under the  FSMA.[97]
 
The  FSA  has  been  able  to  adopt  a  consistent , coherent  and  focussed  approach  across  the  financial  
services  industry  to  cross-sector  issues.[98]  However  there  have  also  been  arguments  as  to  whether  
or  not  a  single  regulator  can  give  a  coherent  and  clear  mandate.  
In relation to its statutory objectives, the first objective, maintaining confidence in the UK financial system, 
is one which can be delivered effectively only in close collaboration with the Bank.8 The framework for that 
collaboration has already been set out in a Memorandum of Understanding between the Treasury, the Bank 
and the FSA. 9
In relation to its fourth objective, the reduction of financial crime, the FSA's rules require authorised firms to 
report “significant” fraud to the FSA.10 The auditor also has to report directly to the FSA under ISA (UK and 
Ireland)  250 Section  B.  The auditor  and  the  deposit  taker  have  further  reporting  obligations  under  the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Money Laundering Regulations, 2003 (amended) to report suspicious 
offences of money laundering including those emanating from fraud and theft.11
In relation to the second  and third objectives , the FSA needs to get closer to the market and consumers. 
From  the  Treasury  Committee's  First  Report  on  Barings  Bank  and  International  Regulation,  it  was 
highlighted  that  the  Bank  of  England,  the  FSA's  predecessor,  could  not  perform its  main  objective  of 
protecting the financial system without assessment of the functionings of the firms in the market. Same 
applies to the FSA. In order to achieve its objectives to the financial system, public, market and consumers, 
8 See speech by Howard Davies, Chairman of the Financial Services Authority, Wednesday 30th September 1998, “ 
Building the FSA, progress to date and priorities ahead”.
9 ibid
10 SUP  15.3.17R.
11 See ISA (UK and Ireland) 240 : The auditor's responsibility to consider fraud in an audit of financial statements 
paragraphs 44 and 45
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the FSA must get closer to the market and consumers.
This need to get closer to the market requires early warning indicators – indicators which the FSA's 
predecessor,  the Bank of England could easily detect. So who could provide the answer to the gap left as a 
result of the Bank of England's reduced involvement in the banking supervisory process? The FSA in its 
proximity to the market and consumers would also need to be mindful of not getting 'captured' by those it is 
supposed to be regulating. The external auditor would seem to have a role in the banking regulatory process 
by 
i) Acting as an intermediary in getting close to the market and consumers
ii) Helping the regulator avoid regulatory capture
 
C.      HOW THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR FUNCTIONS AS A MIDDLEMAN/AN INTERMEDIARY 
IN THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY PROCESS.
 
Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 620 Revised : The Auditor’s Right and Duty To Report To 
Regulators in the Financial Sector
The International Standard on Auditing (ISA UK and Ireland) 250 sections A and B also respectively deal 
with consideration of laws and regulations in an audit of financial statements and the auditors' right and duty 
to report to regulators in the financial sector .
According to the Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 620 which replaced the original SAS issued in 
1994, directors of regulated entities have primary responsibility for ensuring that all appropriate information 
is made available to regulators. Auditors’ reports on records, systems and returns, regular meetings with 
directors  and/or  senior  management  supplemented  by  any  inspection  visits  considered  necessary  by 
regulators should provide regulators with all the information they need to carry out their responsibilities. 
Through the auditor’s involvement  in the regulatory and supervisory process,  the possibility of capture 
occurring could be reduced significantly as personnel exchange or frequent contact between the regulator 
and the regulated is reduced.
Auditors have routine reporting responsibilities and also responsibilities to provide a special report required 
by the regulator. In addition, auditors are required by law to report, subject to compliance with legislation 
relating to “tipping-off”, direct to a regulator when they conclude that there is reasonable cause to believe 
that a matter is or may be of material significance to the regulator.
 Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ( Communication by Auditors) Regulations 2001 ( “ the 
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2001 Regulations”), the auditor has duties under certain circumstances to make reports to the FSA12. The 
2001 Regulations also do not require the auditor to perform any additonal work because of the the statutory 
duty nor is the auditor required to specifically look out for breaches of  the requirements applicable to a 
certain authorised firm.13
Section 342 of the FSMA 2000 also  14provides that no duty to which an auditor of an authorised firm is 
subject shall be contravened by communicating in good faith to the FSA information or an opinion on a 
matter that the auditor reasonably believes is relevant to any functions of the FSA.
Confidentiality
In accordance with SAS 620, auditors are entitled to communicate to regulators information or opinions in 
good faith about matters relating to business or affairs of the entity or any associated body. However, this 
relates to information and opinions obtained in their capacity as auditors. Auditors and regulators should be 
aware that confidential information obtained in other capacities may not be normally disclosed to another 
party.
Even though confidentiality is an implied term of auditors' contracts  with authorised firms, section 343 of 
the FSMA states that an auditor of an entity closely linked to an authorised firm who is also the auditor of 
that authorised firm does not contravene that duty if he reports to the FSA information or his opinion, if he is 
acting in good faith and if he reasonably believes that the information or opinion is relevant to any function 
of the FSA.15 
Statements of Auditing Standards (SAS) 120 Revised : Consideration of law and regulations
The  revised  Statement  of  Auditing  Standards  (SAS)  120  replaced  the  original  SAS  issued  in  1995. 
According to the Auditing Practices Board, the purpose of this SAS is to establish standards and provide 
guidance on the auditor’s responsibility to consider law and regulations in an audit of financial statements.
 
Responsibilities of the auditors
According to the Auditing Practices Board,[99] ‘it is not the auditor’s function to prevent non-compliance 
12 See ISA (UK and Ireland) 250 section B paragraph 54 of the Auditor's Right and Duty to Report to Regulators in the 
Financial Sector
13 ibid
14 See ISA (UK and Ireland) 250 section B paragraph 82 of the Auditor's Right and Duty to Report to Regulators in the 
Financial Sector
15 See ISA (UK and Ireland) 250 section B paragraph 75 of the Auditor's Right and Duty to Report to Regulators in the 
Financial Sector
                                                                                   25
with law and regulations. The fact that an audit is carried out may, however, act as a deterrent.’ An audit is 
not expected to detect all possible non-compliance with law and regulations. The responsibilities of auditors 
of private sector entities as regards law and regulations are similar to those of auditors of limited companies 
and other entities in the private sector.
Auditors should plan and perform their audit procedures, evaluate and report on the results thereof, 
recognising  that  non-compliance  by  the  entity  with  law  or  regulations  may  materially  affect  the 
financial statements (SAS 120.1). This can be done through [100] : (a) obtaining a general understanding of 
the legal and regulatory framework applicable to the entity and the industry, and of the procedures followed 
in order to ensure compliance with that framework; (b) inspection of correspondence with relevant licensing 
or regulatory authorities; (c ) making enquiries with directors as to whether they are aware of notice of any 
such possible instances of non-compliance with law and regulations; and (d) obtaining written confirmation 
from the directors that they have disclosed to the auditors all those events of which they are aware which 
involve possible non-compliance, together with the actual or contingent consequence which could arise there 
from. 
Returning to the instances mentioned by Grabowsky and Braithwaite, as to where capture is more likely to 
occur, the Standards ( SASs) could help prevent conflict between the regulator and the regulated as the 
external auditor’s involvement in the regulatory and supervisory process, according to the SASs, presents a 
situation whereby the regulator becomes less involved – through the external auditor acting on behalf of the 
regulator. Hence there is likely to be less conflict between the regulator and the regulated. The possibility of 
regular contact between the regulator and the regulated is also less likely where the external auditor acts on 
behalf of the regulator. Where the regulator is part of a larger organisation, the external auditor could still 
help prevent regulatory capture. There are many advantages in having a single mega regulator which still 
maintains  some form of  “uniqueness”  within  the  departments  in  its  organisation.  Uniqueness  refers  to 
individuality and even though retaining some individuality within the different industry sectors which make 
up a single regulator is contrary to the spirit of a truly integrated approach, it is practically difficult for all 
separate sectors to work under a common objective without taking into consideration differences relating to 
these sectors. Even in a truly integrated single regulator organisation, there is still likely to be conflict or 
clash between sectors due to different backgrounds or certain objectives which are difficult to reconcile in 
given circumstances. A truly integrated approach is however workable where clearly defined law exists to 
deal with potential conflicts,  inconsistencies between different  sectors – especially in matters relating to 
objectives. This is not particularly an area where an external auditor has much influence – the law makers are 
responsible for drafting clearly defined and unambiguous law. The external auditor’s role is to work on 
behalf of the regulator, with the relevant department/s which make up the regulator and communicate with 
the regulated.
Procedures to be followed  when possible non-compliance with law or regulations is discovered.
According to SAS 120.5, auditors should obtain an understanding of the nature of the act, the circumstances 
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in  which  it  occurred  and  sufficient  other  information  to  evaluate  the  possible  effect  on  the  financial 
statements when they become aware  of information which indicates that non-compliance with law may 
exist.
They should then document their findings and subject to compliance with legislation relating to “tipping off” 
and any other requirement to report them direct to a third party, discuss them with the appropriate level of 
management (SAS 120.6).
Auditors should also consider the implications of suspected or actual non-compliance with law or regulations 
in relation to other aspects of the audit (SAS 120.7).  
Reporting non-compliance with law or regulations
Action taken by auditors to report a suspected or actual non-compliance with law or regulations varies 
according to their statutory responsibilities. In accordance with SAS 120.8 and subject to compliance with 
legislation relating to “tipping-off” and, save where SAS 120.15 applies, auditors should as soon as 
practicable, either : (a) communicate with management and the board of directors including the audit 
committee, or (b) obtain evidence that they are appropriately informed.
 
Auditors can also : (a ) Report to addressees of the auditor’s report on the financial statements (SAS 120.10); 
(b) Report to third parties (SAS 120.12).
 
                                 D.   CONCLUSION
Even as there are limits to what a regulator can do, the external auditor is also confronted by obstacles which 
could prevent him from carrying out his duties and responsibilities effectively. Such factors include factors 
which could affect the independence and objectivity of the auditor. These, however will not be discussed in 
detail in this paper. According to accounting literature, the traditional role of the audit was primarily the 
detection and prevention of fraud. The main objective of the audit today is the verification of financial 
information.[101] Through assisting the regulator in the verification of financial information, he provides 
assistance to the regulator and gives credibility to such information. This role requires an independent and 
objective mind. The risks involved in using external auditors include lack of independence and lack of 
objectivity whilst performing their duties. The performance of non-audit work by external auditors has 
contributed a great deal to these risks. The European Commission issued a Recommendation “Statutory 
Auditors’ Independence in the EU : A Set of Fundamental Principles” on the 16 May 2002. The new 
directive introduced requires all firms listed on the stock exchange to have independent audit committees and 
that auditors/audit partners must be rotated. These measures are all aimed at reducing the risks posed to the 
auditor’s independence and objectivity. However, it does not deal with the separation of auditors from 
consultancy work (despite the threat of non-audit work to the auditor’s independence).
 
 On the 24 July 2002, an immediate review  of the regulatory arrangements for the accountancy and audit 
professions was called for by Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of Sate for Trade and Industry. The purpose of this 
review was to look at the way the accountancy and audit professions were regulated, consider whether 
changes should be made and whether there should be a statutory basis for regulation.[102]  On the 11 March 
2003 the Department of Trade and Industry published a  consultation document “Review of the Regulatory 
Regime of the Accountancy Profession : Legislative Proposals” and the aims and objectives of the new FRC 
and its Boards have since been published[103] .
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Regulators are also mindful of  regulatory capture and are putting measures in place to deal with it. To assess 
these measures,  it will be necessary to undertake the comparative study of different jurisdictions to assess 
them. The existing  situation  in  the  UK  whereby  the  FSA  is  the  sole  authority  involved  in  the 
regulatory  process  exposes  it  to  more  “capture” than  the  situation  in  Germany  whereby a  single all-
embracing  regulator  just  like  the  FSA, “The  Federal  Financial  Supervisory Authority ( Bundesanstalt 
fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht  - BaFin)  shares  responsibilities  with  the central bank ( the Deutsche 
Bundesbank). As  a  result  of  these  differences , the  banking  supervisory process  in  the  UK  would  not 
only benefit from the  expertise of having more external auditors share regulatory responsibilities with the 
FSA but would also help the FSA avoid regulatory capture. In order to supervise banks more effectively, 
knowledge of the workings of monetary dynamics is an essential tool. In monetary policy, the main 
questions are how far unemployment can fall before inflation  starts to rise and how quickly inflation can be 
curbed if it goes up for any reason.[104]. For this reason, the FSA needs to get closer to the market and is in 
need of early warning indicators about market changes and developments – indicators which would ideally 
have benn provided by the Bank of England's expertise. However, since the Bank of England is not involved 
the bank supervisory process, the external auditor could help fill this gap by getting closer to the market  and 
consumers and also reduce the likelihood of the FSA getting 'captured' by the market.
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